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A local jurisdiction that regulates power plant emissions, but participates in a larger regional power 
market faces the issue of emissions leakage, in which local emissions decrease, but emissions 
associated with the imported power increase. Border carbon adjustment (BCA) schemes can be 
imposed on imports in an attempt to lessen leakage. This paper explores the potential cost and 
emission impacts of alternative BCA policies that could be implemented in the California AB32 carbon 
pricing system. We focus on cost and emission impacts on the power sector in California and the rest 
of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) region, the latter of which provides 
approximately 23.5% of California’s electricity requirements. 
 
With both a simple schematic model and a detailed WECC generation-transmission expansion 
planning model for the year 2034 called JHSMINE, we examine the following deemed emission rate 
schemes for estimating and charging for emissions associated with electricity imports: no BCA, facility 
(import source)-specific deemed rate, a facility-neutral and constant deemed rate, and a facility-
neutral and dynamic deemed rate. Our results suggest that, compared with cases with either no BCA 
or a BCA using facility-based deemed emission rates, facility-neutral schemes can provide efficiency 
gains by simultaneously lowering WECC-wide emissions and costs without raising payments by 
California consumers. Emissions leakage declines greatly. The precise value of the deemed rate affects 
these gains. One particular facility-neutral dynamic scheme in which rates are set by marginal emission 
rates external to California provides the greatest gain in economic efficiency. Our results also show 
the impact of carbon pricing and BCAs on transmission investment economics: California’s unilateral 
AB32 carbon pricing encourages more interstate transmission expansion because power imports are 
more profitable; however, BCAs that are cost-effective in lowering total regional emissions will 
dampen those incentives. 
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Abstract. A local jurisdiction that regulates power plant emissions, but participates in a larger 
regional power market faces the issue of emissions leakage, in which local emissions decrease, but 
emissions associated with the imported power increase. Border carbon adjustment (BCA) schemes 
can be imposed on imports in an attempt to lessen leakage. This paper explores the potential cost 
and emission impacts of alternative BCA policies that could be implemented in the California 
AB32 carbon pricing system. We focus on cost and emission impacts on the power sector in 
California and the rest of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) region, the latter 
of which provides approximately 23.5% of California’s electricity requirements. With both a 
simple schematic model and a detailed WECC generation-transmission expansion planning model 
for the year 2034 called JHSMINE, we examine the following deemed emission rate schemes for 
estimating and charging for emissions associated with electricity imports: no BCA, facility (import 
source)-specific deemed rate, a facility-neutral and constant deemed rate, and a facility-neutral and 
dynamic deemed rate. Our results suggest that, compared with cases with either no BCA or a BCA 
using facility-based deemed emission rates, facility-neutral schemes can provide efficiency gains 
by simultaneously lowering WECC-wide emissions and costs without raising payments by 
California consumers. Emissions leakage declines greatly. The precise value of the deemed rate 
affects these gains. One particular facility-neutral dynamic scheme in which rates are set by 
marginal emission rates external to California provides the greatest gain in economic efficiency. 
Our results also show the impact of carbon pricing and BCAs on transmission investment 
economics: California’s unilateral AB32 carbon pricing encourages more interstate transmission 
expansion because power imports are more profitable; however, BCAs that are cost-effective in 
lowering total regional emissions will dampen those incentives. 
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All carbon pricing policies are limited in geographical and/or sector coverage (World Bank, 
2017). Furthermore, limited geographical coverage can induce so-called carbon leakage, i.e., 
increased emissions in non-regulated jurisdictions or sectors, because their production will become 
more competitive than production in the regulated jurisdiction (IPCC, 2014). Leakage therefore 
diminishes the effectiveness of local regulation.  Consequently, in the case of imports from 
unregulated regions, this issue has led to proposals for border cost adjustment (BCA) schemes in 
which imports and exports of commodities between regulated and external jurisdictions are 
regulated, subsidized, and/or taxed (e.g., border tax adjustment) (Böhringer et al., 2012; Fischer 
and Fox, 2012; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007).1 Intuitively, regulations/subsidies/taxes can be imposed 
upon inter-state transactions, the most basic form of interaction. BCA on import transactions 
typically requires the buyer or the seller to pay a carbon tax or surrender carbon emission 
allowances at an assumed emission rate for the commodity, perhaps differentiated by the source 
or other attributes.2A key decision for policymakers is thus how to set emission rates for imports, 
also called deemed emission rates (or default emission rates). In this paper, we use the terms 
deemed and default emission rates interchangeably, denoting them both as DR. 
However, because of the homogeneity of electricity and the inability to unambiguously 
trace power from source to user,3 when the DR is set on the basis of assumptions about which 
power plants in the non-regulated region are the sources of imports, there is a strong incentive for 
non-regulated power plants to rearrange contracts among themselves. This rearrangement, called 
shuffling, results in those imports being assigned to relatively low-emission facilities, while 
assigning high-emission plant output to users in the non-regulated region, thus apparently reducing 
emissions associated with imports without actually changing the physical dispatch. Consequently, 
a large portion of emission reductions occurs only on paper. This contract (or resource) shuffling 
has been widely recognized by academia (Bushnell et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2011; Ismer and 
Neuhoff, 2007) and policymakers (CAISO, 2018).  
 
1 In this work, we emphasis importing jurisdictions, where most of the debate about BCA has focused. 
2 BCA regulation can also specify whether to rebate for the export carbon taxes paid on transactions or otherwise 
provide an exemption from paying for emissions (Fischer and Fox, 2012; PJM, 2020).  





An alternative DR scheme that eliminates the incentive for shuffling applies the same DR 
to all imports. However, there remains the question of the best level for the DR, and whether it 
should vary over time. To policymakers in the regulated jurisdiction, an efficient DR scheme 
would reduce leakage and total regional emissions at minimum cost. In this paper, we consider the 
definition of a Pareto set of DRs that are efficient in terms of cost (either regional or California-
only) and total regional emissions, while identifying inefficient DRs which would have either 
higher cost or higher emission, or both, than some point in the Pareto set. To define the Pareto set, 
we consider simple DR schemes imposing the same DR for any imports at any time (constant and 
facility-neutral), and more complicated schemes, including static but facility-based schemes, 
facility-neutral but dynamic schemes.  
California’s carbon pricing currently uses facility-based (or sometimes source-region-
based) DR for estimating import emissions. That is, California cap-and-trade system requires 
electricity importers to specify the source of electricity contracts and to surrender allowances on 
the basis of the emissions rate of that supply (CARB, 2014). If no particular source is specified, a 
generic allowance surrender rate of 0.428 tons/MWh is imposed. Several alternative approaches 
exist to dynamically calculate the DR (or determine who is truly responsible for the imports), by 
using near-term or real-time system operation information. For instance, the California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO) had proposed a so-called two-stage framework to calculate 
the real-time composition of California net imports (CAISO, 2017). Although this proposal was 
not ultimately implemented, it highlights the possibility of using real-time information to identify 
which external plans truly support the demand for imports and then setting the DR accordingly.  
Use of dynamic marginal emission rates calculated on a system basis has also been 
proposed for BCA schemes. Such analyses underlay studies of pass-through of carbon costs to 
electricity prices (Kim et al., 2010; Sijm et al., 2012). Because electricity prices will increase due 
to the imposed carbon cost (pass-through), an effective carbon tax per unit of electricity can be 
calculated based on the emissions of the marginal unit in the regulated market times the carbon 
price. Using marginal pricing principles, a system operator can calculate the rise in electricity price 
because of carbon pricing within the regulated market and, on the basis of this increase in price, 
artificially lower the electricity price paid to imports from external generators. This can be viewed 
as being equivalent to a BCA in which the DR is based on marginal internal (regulated market) 




Independent System Operator (NYISO, 2018). Although New York State is a member of Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), NYISO proposes adopting a carbon cost of approximately 
$50/ton for electricity sold on its market, which is much higher than the current RGGI allowance 
price of about $5/ton (RGGI, 2018). To prevent the leakage that such a high price might incent,  
adoption of a BCA scheme is required; NYISO proposes to use the above method to lower the ex 
post power price for imports by the amount of the CO2 premium resulting from its carbon pricing 
(NYISO, 2018). 
The marginal emission rate of generators outside of a carbon pricing regime (i.e., the 
external marginal emission rate) can also be used. Specifically, system-wide marginal emission 
rates have been estimated for the United Kingdom (UK) in Hawkes (2010), for the U.S. in Siler-
Evans et al. (2012), and locally for the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland interconnection in 
(PJM, 2019). In short, dynamic DR calculations are possible and are under active consideration 
for implementation in BCA schemes.  
The elements of BCA policy include not only the DR for the cross-border transaction, i.e., 
whether to discriminate among sources or over time (e.g., day vs. night, or summer vs. winter), 
but also the direction of BCA (whom to charge/rebate), i.e., whether to charge imports, rebate 
exports or both (Fischer and Fox, 2012). For example, the PJM interconnection includes both 
RGGI member and non-member states, and thus is considering BCA options among its subregions 
to mitigate carbon leakage, either by only imposing emission charges on imports (one-way) or 
rebating exports as well (two-way); the assumed DRs are facility-based (PJM, 2020). However, in 
this paper, we emphasize policies involving only charging imports and not giving rebates to 
exports, consistent with California policy. Our results focus on solving the problem of defining 
Pareto optimal DRs for imported power, although we do briefly summarize an analysis of a BCA 
with rebates for exports. 
How carbon pricing affects power systems has a long history of research, such as Bushnell 
et al. (2014); Chen et al. (2011); Hytowitz (2018); Lanz and Rausch (2011); Levin et al. (2019); 
Palmer et al. (2017). In one example, Chen et al. (2011) and Bushnell et al. (2014) have revealed 
that a high volume of contract shuffling in the electricity sector would likely accompany high 
carbon leakage in the California cap-and-trade system. Levin et al. (2019), with a power system 
expansion planning model, has shown that the adoption of a carbon tax in Texas is a cost-efficient 




and Rausch (2011) compared the results from top-down and bottom-up modeling approaches 
applied to a national carbon pricing policy in the United States.  
Researchers, however, have yet to address fine tuning of BCA strategies and identification 
of Pareto optimal deemed emission rates for imports. Our goal is to address this general question 
in the context of the first state-level carbon trading program in the US, California’s AB32. Here, 
we use a bottom-up approach to capture the diversity of generation technologies, transmission 
limitations, and the geographical distribution of fuels and demands that are critical to determining 
the impact of carbon regulation on trade patterns, costs, and prices within the power sector. We 
model the investment decisions of power generation, the hourly dispatch of generation and 
transmission, and the bilateral trading of the energy credit in a single optimization, which in turn 
is equivalent to a long-run power market equilibrium. Similar modeling approaches have been 
used in Bushnell et al. (2014); Lanz and Rausch (2011); Levin et al. (2019); Özdemir et al. (2020); 
Palmer et al. (2017). Other electricity analyses have been more aggregate (Chen et al., 2011) or 
have considered just short-run operational (dispatch) effects (Hytowitz, 2018; PJM, 2020). For 
analyses that have used complementarity problem representations rather than a cost minimization 
approach to calculate partial equilibria in a power market, see, e.g., Chen et al. (2011); Zhao et al. 
(2010). Our work here differs from previous studies in two ways: 
 We provide detailed engineering-economic modeling of generation and transmission 
expansion in response to carbon pricing policies, whereas most previous studies do not 
consider transmission investment. Transmission congestion significantly impacts 
operations and emissions in the WECC system; and we therefore conjecture that the 
economics of new transmission could be significantly affected by carbon policy, while 
transmission investment could alter the impacts of carbon policy. 
 We provide detailed modeling of credit trading for renewable portfolio standards as well 
as its interaction with trade, leakage, contract shuffling, and BCA issues, and their joint 
effects on power sector investment. In contrast, previous studies have either focused on 
carbon pricing rather and not BCA design, e.g., Chen et al. (2011), or disregarded 
interstate/inter-jurisdictional interactions altogether, e.g., Levin et al. (2019). 
In this paper, we analyze the potential economic efficiency gains and impacts of different 
DR settings. More specifically, we ask the following two questions: (1) For a unilateral carbon 




emission reductions, emission leakage, regional electricity production, transmission expansion, 
and consumer payments? (2) Given the current California AB32 cap-and-trade system, if we define 
a "better" DR scheme as providing Pareto improvements (i.e., lower overall emissions and higher 
market efficiency), do such schemes exist, and how large might their benefits be in the year 2034 
under one set of assumptions?   
We do not claim that these results are a definitive assessment of the benefits of alternative 
BCA approaches for California, but rather they provide some basic insights about the relationship 
of deemed rates to leakage and cost-effective emissions reductions that may be also be applicable 
elsewhere.  Before presenting our long-run equilibrium model and the results of its application 
(Sections 3 and 4, respectively), we provide a simple two-region example that illustrates some 
general conclusions concerning the efficiency of deemed rates in BCA schemes; the California 
application then quantifies the magnitude of the benefits and costs of alternative DRs in a realistic 
context. 
2 Illustrative Two-Node Example 
In this section, we use a simple two-node example to illustrate several essential concepts 
and qualitative results if carbon pricing (with or without BCA) is implemented in a power-
importing state, such as California.  
 
Fig. 1. The two-node example. 
The two-node example is a single-hour economic dispatch without transmission limits. 
Five generators (A to E), each with a different marginal cost, emission rate, and capacity, are 
dispatched to meet the electricity demand at two nodes (Nodes 1 and 2). The data are shown in 




If a carbon price of $20/ton is applied at Node 1, part of it will be passed through, resulting in 
higher power prices. 
This example demonstrates four cases:  
 No carbon price; 
 Node 1 with a carbon price at $20/ton; 
 On top of the $20/ton carbon price, Node 1 charges imports using a facility-based DR; and 
 On top of the $20/ton carbon price, Node 1 charges imports by using a DR of 1.3 tons/MWh, 
which is the same as the emission rate of generator C. 
The solutions are compared in terms of resource cost, defined as the total operation cost, excluding 
the price of carbon. A relative accounting carbon leakage metric is defined as the relative 
difference between the "system-wide emission reduction" and "regulated emission reduction," 
with the latter calculated as the local emissions plus the imported deemed emissions (Chen et al., 
2011; Ruth et al., 2008). Let the system-wide emissions reduction, local emissions reduction, rest 
of system emissions reduction, and accounted imported emissions reduction be defined as S, L, R, 
and I, respectively. Then the reduction in regulated emissions is (L+I), and S = L + R. The relative 
accounting leakage = 100% - S/(L+I) = 100% - (L+R)/(L+I), which can be interpreted as the 
portion of claimed reductions that do not really occur when the entire system is considered. We 
note that the accounting leakage is non-zero if and only if I ≠ R; i.e., the leakage is non-zero if 
the accounted imported emission reduction is a biased estimate of the rest of the system emission 
reduction. When the BCA uses contract sources' emission rate for imported emission calculation, 
such a bias is introduced by the contract shuffling between existing/new emitting contracts and 
power contracts from less-emitting plants. If instead, a DR scheme applies the same deemed rate 
to all contract sources, then shuffling incentives are removed. In that case, it is the inaccuracy of 
the DR that can introduce bias.   
There is second, and distinct, type of leakage that is frequently used in policy analyses, 
which we call the "physical leakage." This physical leakage can be calculated as 100%×(-R/L), 
which reflects the portion of physical internal emissions reductions that are offset by increased 
emissions outside the region.  In this paper, the term “carbon leakage” will refer to the accounting 




The evaluation of imported emissions, the core of this paper, depends on the choice of BCA 
scheme and DR. Consequently, even before implementing carbon prices, the imported and 
regulated emissions can differ among various BCA schemes.  
Table 1. Results of the Two-node Example 
 No Carbon 
Price 
Carbon Price at $20/ton at Node 1 
No BCA Facility-based 
Deemed rate at 1.3 
tons/MWh 
Sales from Plant to Node: 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
A (sited at Node 1) 20 0 0 0 1 0 20 0 
B (sited at Node 1) 20 0 0 20 20 0 20 0 
C (sited at Node 2) 0 30 21 29 0 49 0 25 
D (sited at Node 2) 11 19 30 0 30 0 6 24 
E (sited at Node 1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 
Emissions at Node 1 30 10 11 32.25 
Deemed Emissions 
Imported by Node 1 
(tons) 
0, 0, 11×1.3 
=14.3 (depends 
on BCA) 
0 (no BCA) 
0 (all imports are 
from Gen D) 
6×1.3 = 7.8 
Regulated Emissions 
(tons) 
30, 30, 44.3  10 11 40.05 
Regulated Emission 
Reduction (RER, tons) 
- 20 19 4.25 
Resource Cost ($) 2200 2400 2390 2230 
Total Emission (tons) 69 75 74.70 64.75 
System Emission 
Reduction (SER, tons) 
- -6 -5.7 4.25 
Accounting Leakage  
(=100% - SER/RER) 
- 130% 130% 0% 
Powerflow from Node 2 
to Node 1 
11 31 30 6 
 
The results of the four cases are shown in Table 1. If there is no carbon price, the dispatch 
follows the merit order formed by plant marginal fuel costs. Consequently, generator C will be the 
marginal unit, and generators A, B, and D will be operated at their maximum capacity. Multiple 
feasible contract arrangements exist, and Table 1 shows one in which the power imports (to Node 
1) are entirely from the emission-free generator D. 
Carbon leakage occurs if a carbon price of $20/ton is implemented at Node 1. Because of 
the carbon price, generation at Node 1 will become expensive. For example, generator A's marginal 
cost will increase to $50/MWh and will then exceed generator C’s. Consequently, the dispatch 




With that carbon price at Node 1, Table 1 shows that, without BCA, no power would be 
generated from A, while C would be dispatched up to fill the gap, with Node 1’s net imports 
increasing from 11 MW to 31 MW. Without A’s generation, the local emissions at Node 1 would 
decrease by 20 tons; however, the system-wide emission would increase by 6 tons because of the 
incremental generation from C, which has a high emissions rate. Because there is no BCA, the 
regulated emissions are by definition the same as the local emissions and also decrease by 20 tons. 
The leakage (a net of 26 tons) is large because the real reduction in total regional emissions of -6 
tons (in fact, this is an increase in emissions) is much lower than the amount seen by Node 1’s 
regulators (20 tons), thus resulting in a leakage of 100% - (-6/20) = 130%. 
If Node 1’s regulators instead implement both the $20/ton tax and a BCA that charges 
electricity imports according to the emission rate of the source facility (hereafter the facility-based 
DR), the imports will be as clean as possible. As shown in Table 1, the least expensive dispatch 
and contract arrangement for Node 1 is to import power from generator D as much as possible, 
who then sells to consumers at Node 1 rather than Node 2. However, this is contract shuffling that 
results in no change in D’s operation.  It is instead C that actually increases its output, just as in 
the no BCA case, but the facility-based BCA system completely fails to detect C’s incremental 
emissions. From the perspective of Node 1’s regulators, the imports now appear to be emission-
free, and the regulated emissions decrease from 30 to 11 tons. The system emissions, however, 
increase by 5.7 tons above the no carbon price case. This is also a leakage of 100% - (-5.7/19) = 
130%. Notably, the facility-based BCA slightly mitigates the system-wide emissions while 
lowering the resource cost relative to that of the no BCA case (0.3 tons and $10), but this Pareto 
efficiency gain is very limited. 
On the other hand, if the regulator at Node 1 instead implements a BCA that deems imports 
from Node 2 as emitting 1.3 tons/MWh, the system will be much cleaner. Because the emission 
regulator charges all imports a carbon price of 1.3×20 = $26/MWh, the imports (and the powerflow) 
greatly decrease. Node 1 is incentivized to dispatch its own fleet and then to rely on imports from 
generator C. Node 1’s local emissions increase, but the system-wide emissions decrease by 4.25 
tons relative to the no regulation case. More importantly, because the imports decrease, the 




emission rate of 1.3 tons/MWh, the imported emissions are 14.3 tons.4 The regulated emissions 
(as if a DR of 1.3 tons/MWh were implemented) then decrease from (30 + 14.3) = 44.3 tons to 
(32.25 + 7.8) = 40.05 tons, or 4.25 tons. Because this reduction happens to be the same as the 
system-wise emission reduction, the relative leakage is coincidently zero (0%). Such a DR at 1.3 
tons/MWh not only provides more emission reductions but also lowers resource costs more than 
both the no BCA case and the facility-based BCA case, thus greatly improving economic 
efficiency. On the other hand, if the DR is set to 0.45 tons/MWh, the solution will be the same as 
that of the no BCA case; this shows that the precise level of the DR can matter greatly. 
Finally, because each of the four cases introduces a different power flow pattern (last row 
of Table 1), the carbon pricing and BCA should strongly affect the value of the transmission. For 
example, compared with the no carbon price case, a carbon price at $20/MWh without BCA 
increases the powerflow from 11 MW to 31 MW. If there is a transmission limit at 15 MW, and 
an upgrade can release the limit, such a transmission upgrade would be valuable. However, if Node 
1 was to implement a 1.3 tons/MWh DR, such an upgrade would have no value at all. In conclusion, 
local carbon pricing in power importing jurisdictions can encourage transmission investment 
because of the artificial increase in the market value of imports, while an effective BCA may 
discourage transmission investments. 
This simple two-node example shows that (1) implementing unilateral local carbon pricing 
will introduce carbon leakage in power systems, thus potentially causing total regional emissions 
to shrink less than local emissions, or even increase; (2) BCA that uses facility-based DR can be 
ineffective in reducing carbon leakage; (3) a high enough DR scheme that is indifferent to import 
sources can mitigate leakage by eliminating incentives to shuffle contracts and thus improve 
economic efficiency; and, finally, (4) unilateral carbon pricing and various BCA schemes can 
affect power flow patterns and the consequent value of transmission reinforcements. Our task is 
now to quantify the impact and to test whether these observations still hold in a realistic system, 
as described in the remainder of this paper.  
 
4 Again, there are multiple contract arrangements because of the homogeneity of electricity, and the 11 MW import 
happens to have the least amount of emissions, as evaluated with both facility-based BCA and BCA with a facility-





3.1 General overview 
The general approach of this work is to first formulate a long-run (investment and 
operations) partial equilibrium problem for a single year (2034) for a competitive multi-
jurisdictional electricity market with transmission constraints and different carbon and RPS rules 
in each jurisdiction or subset of jurisdictions. We show that a single optimization model exists 
whose solution satisfies those equilibrium conditions. If the solution exists, then the optimization 
model can be used to simulate the market and show the impact of alternative formulations of 
carbon border tax rules. This general approach is widely used in energy market modeling (Gabriel 
et al., 2013) and in environmental regulation in the power sector; an example is demonstrated by 
Chen et al. (2011). The single optimization is in the form of a static (single-year) coordinated 
transmission-generation expansion planning, an enhanced version of Johns Hopkins Stochastic 
Multistage Integrated Network Expansion tool based on Xu and Hobbs (2019).  
The core of this formulation involves modeling the non-electrical attributes of power 
generation, which broadly include but are not limited to the time of generation, source, sink, 
renewable credits, and emissions. The value/cost of these attributes can be artificially created by 
regulations such as RPS and carbon pricing. We model these attributes with one single variable, 
contract power flow (cpfw,h,k), and thus we implicitly assume that these attributes are bundled. The 
definition of this variable is "the MW attributes sold from GenCO k at hour h to LSE w"; effectively, 
it is a bilateral contract for energy credits. For instance, if 60% of California’s electricity demand 
must be supported by contracts from renewable resources, no more than 40% must be from non-
renewable sources; consequently, California LSEs must buy non-renewable credits to support such 
a composition (possibly at zero price). That is, the contract power flow that we defined is a 
generalization of the renewable energy credit of RPS and the emission allowances of carbon 
pricing, and can encompass both. The model can be easily modified to consider the emission 
allowance and renewable credit as unbundled by defining two variables, and we will consider the 
impact of bundling as a direction for future research. 
With the above framework of tracking non-electrical attributes of power generation 
established, the BCA mechanism can be readily modeled. We start the model presentation by 
defining the nomenclature of the problem and then listing the optimization problems of different 




(LSEs). Finally, we end this section by documenting the equivalent single optimization in the form 
of coordinated transmission-generation expansion planning.  
3.2 Nomenclature 
3.2.1 Sets and Indices 
H Hours, index h 
I Buses, index i 
K Generators, index k 
ik Bus i where generator k is located 
Ki  Generators connected to bus i 
Kw Generators belonging to state w 
L Transmission lines, index l 
W States/provinces, index w (note that more generally, other geographic divisions can 
be used, and multiple LSEs can serve an individual division). 
Y Years, index y 
wk Index: state w that financially owns generator k; also called the home state of 
generator k 
3.2.2 Parameters 
AERh Average emission rate at hour h, additional super/subscripts will apply depending 
on the context, units: tons/MWh 
CTAXw  Carbon price or tax of state w, units: $/ton 
DRw,h,k Deemed emission rate assumed for the energy credit contract between the state-
level LSE w and generator k at hour h, units: tons/MWh 
GCOMIk Initial generator commission status of generator k, 0–1, unitless; 1 if the total 
available capacity is fully in commission.  
GERk Emission rate of generator k, units: MW 
GEXCAk Annualized generation expansion cost, units: $/year 
GFOMk  Fixed operating and maintenance cost of generator k, units: $/MW-year 
GHAVk,h Hourly availability of generator k , unitless 





HWy,h # of hours represented by hour h in year y, units: hour 
IRPSw  In-state renewable portfolio standard (RPS) of state w, unitless (fraction of demand) 
LBIl,i  Line-bus incidence matrix: 1 if bus i is the to-bus of line l; -1 if bus i is the from-
bus of line l; 0 otherwise, unitless  
LCOMIl Initial commission status of transmission line l, 0–1, unitless 
LEXCAl Annualized transmission expansion cost for transmission line l, units: $/year 
LTMl  Line rating (or the thermal limit) of transmission line l, units: MW 
MERh Marginal emission rate at hour h, additional super/subscripts will apply depending 
on the context, units: tons/MWh 
REw,k  Renewable eligibility; 1 of generator k is considered renewable in state w, unitless  
RPSw  RPS of state w, unitless 
VOLL Value of lost load, units: $/MWh 
3.2.3 Variables 
cpfw,h,k Variable: energy credit contract from generator k to state-level LSE w at hour h, 
units: MW 
cpfbw,h,k Variable: energy credit contract purchased by the state-level LSE w from generator 
k at hour h, units: MW 
cpfsw,h,k Variable: energy credit contract sold by generator k to the state-level LSE w at hour 
h, units: MW  
λ Dual variables: shadow prices of the constraints; the meaning and the units depend 
on the super/subscripts 
gincexpk  Generator incremental expansion, 1 if generator k starts to be commissioned, 0 to 
1, unitless 
gincrets',y'  Generator incremental retirement, 1 if generator k is fully decommissioned from its 
initial status, 0 to 1, unitless 
gstatk  Generator commission status, 1 if generator k is in commission, 0 to 1, unitless  
gopth,k  Power output of generator k at hour h, nonnegative, units: MW 
lincexpl  Transmission line incremental expansion, 1 if transmission line l becomes 
commissioned, 0 to 1, unitless 





pfh,l Power flow on transmission line l at hour h, unrestricted, units: MW 
nloadh,i  Load shedding at bus i at hour h, nonnegative, units: MWh 
nrpsh,w  Non-compliance with RPS policy, nonnegative, units: MW 
3.3 ISO problem 
The ISO's objective is to maximize its annualized profit from arbitrage across the nodes of 
the network and to expand the network, if profitable, by paying the annualized capital cost of the 
transmission line. Although the ISO is not maximizing the congestion rent in the real word, it is a 
good approximation because it is equivalent to maximizing the surplus from supply and demand 
bids (see Hobbs et al. (2000)). The objective is to maximize equation (1), where the variable 𝜆ℎ,𝑖
𝐿𝑀𝑃 
is the locational marginal price:  
 , , ,Maximize
LMP
h i l h i h l l l
h l i l
ISO HW LBI pf LEXCA lincexp
 
=    −  
 
     (1)  
Constraints (2) and (3), below, are the upper and lower limits of the power flow imposed 
by transmission line thermal limits. Although this is a pipes-and-bubbles representation, a 
linearized DC load flow is possible. Constraint (4) keeps track of the line availability, and 
Constraint (5), below, is the upper limit of the line availability and the expansion decision. 
 
, ,0 ( ) ,h l l l h lpf LTM lstat h l−     (2) 
 , ,0 ( ) ,h l l l l hpf LTM lstat h l− −     (3) 
 ( ) 0 ( )Tel l l llstat LCOMI lincexp l− + =   (4) 
 ( ), 1 0 ( , )Ts Txl l l llstat lincexp l −     (5) 
The optimality conditions, i.e., the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions, can be 
derived as in (6) to (12). Of note, we scale up the hourly constraint by the number of hours HWh 
while deriving the optimality conditions in the remainder of this section.  
 ( ), , , , ,, 0 ,
LMP
h l h l h l i l h i
i
pf free LBI h l  − −  =    (6) 
 ( ), ,0 0Te Tsl h l h j h l l l
h
lstat HW LTM l    ⊥ −   + − +     (7) 
 0 0Tx Tel l l llincexp LEXCA l  ⊥ + +    (8) 
 




 , ,0 0 ,h l h l l lpf LTM lstat h l ⊥ +    (10) 
 ( ), 0Tel l l lfree lstat LCOMI lincexp l − + =    (11) 
 ( )0 , , 1 0Ts Txl l l llstat lincexp l  ⊥ − +    (12) 
3.4 Generation Companies 
Each GenCO k attempts to maximize its annualized profit from the energy market, and thus 
the objective is to maximize Eq. (13) subject to constraints (14) to (17). For simplicity, we omit 
"for all k" from the constraint domain and omit nonnegative constraints as well. The objective 
function of each GenCo Eq. (13) is the annual net profit, which equals the revenues from both the 
electricity market and the energy credits market minus the variable cost, carbon allowance cost, 
and fixed operation and maintenance cost. If profitable, the generation companies will expand the 
generation fleet by paying the annualized expansion cost; if keeping the plant running is not 
economical, the generation capacity will be retired.  
, , , , , ,
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Constraint (14) is the capacity limit of the generation output for each hour, accounting for 
both forced outage rates and (in the case of intermittent sources) hydro, wind, or solar availability, 
and constraint (15) requires generator k to sell all the non-electric attributes to the LSEs through 
energy credit contracts (cpfw,h,k). Constraint (16) keeps track of the plant status, i.e., how much of 
the maximum capacity is available in a given hour. Constraint (17) is the upper limit of the 
generator availability, expansion decision, and retirement decision. 
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3.5 Load-Serving Entities 
We assume that the LSE demand is purely inelastic (i.e., a fixed load), and thus the LSE is 
minimizing the cost of serving the load while meeting the RPS obligation. This scenario can be 
readily generalized to the cases in which the demand is elastic, as shown in Chen et al. (2011). 
However, doing so results in a nonlinear program, in general. We model LSEs at the state level, 
and we also assume that LSEs are the so-called "first deliverers" of electricity, a term used in the 
California system to assign the obligation to pay for carbon emissions. That is, an LSE is assumed 
to be the owner of the electricity at the first point of delivery in California and would be the point 
of the regulation (CARB, 2014). Consequently, LSEs are subject to BCA (boxed term in the 
objective function Eq. (27)). Importantly, the boxed term in the objective function is also called 
the "imported emissions." The deemed rate applied can vary according to the policy assumptions 
for the particular run. The objective function of an LSE is to minimize (27), in a manner subject 
to constraints (28) to (30). For simplicity, we omit "for all w" from the constraint domain and omit 
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  (27) 
Constraints (28) and (29) are, respectively, the general RPS requirement and the in-state 
RPS requirement (or, more generally, the within jurisdiction constraint, which can be a subunit of 
a state or collection of states; the constraint could also encompass multiple LSEs, in general). 
Notably, energy credits brought from other states are not eligible for meeting the in-state RPS 
requirement (29), but they could be used in meeting the general RPS requirement (28). Constraint 
(30) is a requirement for LSEs that the served load must be equal to the sum of purchased energy 
credit contracts, and the composition of the generation that meets the supported load will be 
specified at an hourly resolution.  
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We can derive the optimality conditions of the LSE problem as in (31) to (36). The boxed 
item in condition (33) appears only if the LSE is located in a unilateral carbon pricing jurisdiction, 
and that jurisdiction chooses to implement BCA that charges imports for deemed carbon emissions. 
 ( ), ,0 0RPS ACUB RPS IRPSw h w w h w wn ACP h   ⊥ + − +    (31) 
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3.6 Market Clearing Conditions 
There are two markets in this equilibrium: the electricity market, with its market-clearing 
condition (37), and the bilateral energy credit market, with its market-clearing condition (38).  
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3.7 An Equivalent Single Optimization 
A single optimization exists that is equivalent to the equilibrium problem comprising the 
problems of GenCos, LSEs, and the ISO in the above subsections. The objective function of this 
single optimization is to minimize Eq. (39), which is the sum of all individual objectives. Of note, 
the boxed term appears only when the carbon pricing regime charges the import at the assumed 
carbon tax/price. The boxed term is the total payment from the LSEs to the emission regulator 
(which is not a market party within the model), owing to the imported energy credit contracts. By 
leaving out the emission regulator's revenues from the objective, this model simulates the actions 
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The constraints are the union of all individual operation and construction constraints, as 
well as the market-clearing conditions, that appear in the above subsection. That is, the constraints 
of the single optimization include (2)–(5), (14)–(17), (28)–(30), (37), and (38). As first shown in 
Samuelson (1952) and applied in Chen et al. (2011), there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
(i) all optimality conditions (not shown) of this single optimization and (ii) the union of the 
optimality conditions of the individual problems and market clearing constraints shown above. 
Thus, the following is implied: if a solution exists to the equilibrium problem, i.e., the union of 
market party KKT conditions and market clearing conditions in Sections 3.3 to 3.6, it will also be 
an optimal solution for the single optimization constituted by objective function, e.g., (39) and 
associated constraints, and vice versa. Furthermore, if one is unique, so is the other. Therefore, we 
should be able to obtain an equilibrium solution for the market by solving the single optimization 
problem. Therefore, in the remainder of the analysis, we can, and do, solve a single optimization 
equivalent to the market equilibrium problem to simulate the market outcomes under alternative 
BCA schemes. 
4 Experimental Design 
4.1 Candidate Deemed Rate Schemes 
Table 2. summarizes several possible modifications of the current implementation of AB32 




Table 2. Alternative Carbon Border Tax Adjustment Schemes 
Case ID  Deemed Rate Scheme 
1  No BCA, or DR = 0 tons/MWh 
2  Constant and Facility-based 
3  Constant and Facility-neutral 
4.a  Dynamic and Facility-neutral: Internal Marginal 
4.b  Dynamic and Facility-neutral: External Marginal 
4.c  Dynamic and Facility-neutral: Internal Average 
4.d  Dynamic and Facility-neutral: External Average 
  
Cases 1–4 (Table 2) differ in how the parameter set DRw,h,k is calculated. The DR is defined 
as how much CO2e emissions the regulator assigns to each energy credit transaction. For simplicity, 
the dimension of CO2e (metric tons) is hereafter is referred to as tons. The first and simplest DR 
setting is DR = 0 tons/MWh. A DR of zero is the same as the pure supply side/source-based carbon 
pricing case in which only California sources are regulated because LSEs have no responsibility 
to report the imported emission and surrender the associated allowances.  
The second DR setting (Case 2, Table 2) is based on the supply side of a contract, as 
currently implemented in the California carbon pricing system, in which the first deliverer 
(importer) must specify the source of emission associated with the contract and surrender the 
associated emission allowances in proportion to the source's emissions.5  
The third DR setting (Case 3, Table 2) involves applying a uniform DR for all contracts at 
all times, i.e., a constant and technology-neutral DR. We test a range of DRs from 0.02 to 0.50 
tons/MWh with a step size of 0.02 tons/MWh, with the upper limit corresponding to the emission 
rate of a typical natural gas combustion turbine.  
There are four subtypes of the dynamic and facility-neutral DR setting, i.e., 4.a to 4.d. The 
DR settings Cases (4.a) and (4.b) apply a dynamic technology-neutral DR and are based on the  
 
5 If the first deliverer cannot (or chooses not to) specify the source, an "unspecified-source" emission will apply at 
0.428 tons/MWh (Bushnell et al., 2014; Pavley, 2016). Intuitively, this scenario provides an approach for coal plants 
to mask their emissions by not reporting the source but may also be viewed as penalizing renewable sources whose 
emissions are below that rate. Because the cost of source-specification is difficult to estimate, we simulate two 
extremes in this paper. One extreme is with 100% source-specification (i.e., Case 2), in which the cost of identifying 
sources of import is assumed negligible. The other extreme is with 0% source-specification, and the cost of source-
specification is assumed sufficiently large that not specifying the source is economical. The latter is modeled as one 
special case in Case 3, in which the constant DR is set to approximately 0.44 tons/MWh. In practice, the importer can 
specify the source of the import transaction with an E-tag, which includes the information of the source, sink, physical 




marginal emissions internal or external to the carbon pricing jurisdiction, respectively; that is, the 
DR for each hour is defined as how much emissions change internally (or externally) in the carbon 
pricing jurisdiction if the state-level load served by internal (external) sources varies by 1 unit. Of 
note, here we calculate short-run marginal emissions with fixed generation capacity, rather than 
long-run marginal emissions that would arise if generation capacity changes are considered. As 
described in Section 1, setting the DR according to the marginal emissions of internal generators 
follows the logic of "the carbon pricing policy rais(ing) the cost of marginal units, which in turn 
sets the electricity prices" (NYISO, 2018). Thus, by basing the DR on internal marginal emissions, 
the regulator can roll back the extra payment to the outside generators caused by internal carbon 
pricing (ibid.). In this sense, alternative Case (4.a) here is closest to the NYISO proposal (ibid.). 
Deemed rate settings (4.c) and (4.d) also apply time-varying DRs, but they are based on average, 
rather than marginal, emissions internal or external to the carbon pricing jurisdiction, respectively.  
To calculate the marginal emissions in Cases (4.a) and (4.b), we raise the load of the carbon 
pricing jurisdiction (in this case, California) by a small incremental amount each hour. We do so 
by moving up the energy demand on every bus inside the state in proportion to the original demand 
(Eq. (40) below uses California as an example). Then, the model is re-dispatched for the entire 
multistate system; the incremental system-wide emissions are the marginal emissions with respect 
to the demand increase. This total is then apportioned to internal and external emission rates as 
follows. External marginal emission rates are calculated by dividing the incremental external 
emissions by the incremental external generation. Internal marginal emission rates are instead 
obtained by dividing the incremental internal emissions by the incremental internal generation. Of 
note, in calculating the external marginal emission rate, all the incremental generation of interest 
might possibly be from inside the state, thus making the denominator equal to zero (or vice versa); 
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In summary, we test all six alternative DR schemes, some of which may involve additional 
calculations, since marginal emissions rates are endogenous. Next, we summarize the use of the 
Gauss-Seidel iteration approach to calculate dynamic DRs.  
4.2 Solving for Dynamic Deemed Emission Rates – A Fixed Point Problem 
Finding the dynamic DRs in Case 4 is essentially finding the solution to a fixed-point 
problem. As a demonstration, let the procedure of calculating the marginal/average emission rate 
(i.e., Equations (40) to (42)) be represented as a fixed point problem in which we are attempting 
to find the solutions x*, y*, DR to the following vector-valued function 
 ( )* *|ERf=DR x ,y DR , 
where (x*, y*) represents the vector comprising the optimal solution of investment decision x and 
operation simulation y, minimizing the societal cost, given a vector of DR and other parameters 
(not shown). That is, (x*, y*) satisfies the following: 
 ( )
( )




x ,y x,y DR  
where F indicates the feasible region, and SC is the societal cost defined in the previous section. 
Thus, finding a DR equal to the marginal/average emission rate essentially involves calculating 
the following fixed-point problem: 




DR x ,y x y DR  
This fixed-point problem corresponds to a cat-and-mouse game between the regulator and 




that the regulator sets the DR at some nominal marginal (or average) emission rate, DRo (which 
might be estimated from previous periods, for instance) and gives the system another chance to re-
dispatch. Consequently, the new marginal generators (and emissions DR1) might differ from those 
in the previous periods, or the total emissions might change (Fig. 2, inner feedback loop). 
Generation and transmission expansion decisions will affect the dispatch results, marginal/average 
emissions, and DRs; the dispatch resulting in each hour will in turn change the value of generation 
and transmission addition, and affect the expansion decision (Fig. 2, outer feedback loop). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Deemed rate (if set according to the marginal emission rate) influences the marginal 
generator and vice versa. 
In this analysis, we use a double-loop fixed-point iteration algorithm in Fig. 3 to attempt to 
find the solution to this fixed-point problem. Please note that a fixed point may not exist, or if it 
does exist, the algorithm may be unsuccessful in finding it. Outer Loop A (yellow box, Fig. 3) 
explicitly models the interaction between investment x and the market operation and DR setting 
(y, DR). We define the convergence of Loop A when the change in the objective function value 
(SC, societal cost) between Loop A iterations is sufficiently small (i.e., < εA = 0.1%). The inner 
Loop B (gray box, Fig. 3), in contrast, is a fixed point iteration to find the DR with a fixed 
generation and transmission expansion plan, that is, modeling the interaction between market 
operation y and the DR setting (DR). We define the convergence of Loop B as a sufficiently small 
mean deviation of DRs between Loop B iterations (i.e., < ε






Fig. 3. Diagram of the algorithm of modeling time-varying DR based on marginal and average 
emission rate. 
 
Loop B is a Gauss-Seidel fixed point iteration between the following two steps: 




y x x y DR , 
( ),AERfDR x y , 
where xA is the fixed expansion plan from outer Loop A. We do not attempt to demonstrate either 
the existence or the convergence of such Gauss-Seidel iteration in this work. However, the method 
is a widely used approach in the energy modeling literature, and some analysis of its convergence 
properties has been described in the context of other applications (Greenberg and Murphy, 1985).  
4.3 Experimental Setting – WECC system 
We test each BCA scheme in Table 2, with five assumed Californian carbon price 
realizations: 0 to $80/tons CO2e with a $20/ton incremental step.
6 In this set of analyses, we run 
the model (Section 3) for the WECC in the year 2034. The system is a reduced network based on 
 
6 At the time of writing, the most recent five rounds of the California-Quebec joint auction of carbon allowance have 
yielded allowance prices of $15.05/ton to $17.16/ton, showing an increasing trend over time (CARB, 2019b). The 
$20/ton value is selected herein as a reasonable price close to price levels today, whereas $40/ton is selected as a high 
carbon price case. This $40/ton is approximately the same as the current carbon tax in British Columbia, Canada of 
$50/ton with an exchange rate of 1.25 CA$ to 1.00 US$ (Morneau, 2018). Other prices are selected to test the 




the 2026 Common Case of the WECC (WECC, 2017) with 361 buses and 712 transmission lines 
using the network reduction method developed in Zhu and Tylavsky (2018). A map of the network 
is shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Map of the test system. Red dots are buses, and green triangles are renewable generation 
candidates. Red lines are existing AC lines, and orange lines are existing high-voltage DC lines. 
Blue lines are the equivalent lines resulting from network reduction. 
 
There are 1504 aggregated existing generators and 810 candidates, spanning 32 
technologies, including coal, gas (combined cycle and combustion turbine), nuclear, wind, solar, 
geothermal, and biofuel. Only gas generation can be built as conventional thermal generators with 
a 5-GW limit on each bus, whereas renewables, i.e., wind, solar, biofuel, and geothermal, can be 
expanded at only 53 candidate sites and would need new transmission lines to be connected to the 
grid. These 53 candidate sites (in addition to the existing 361 buses) and their maximum installed 
capacities are identified in Western Governors' Association and USDOE (2009). Specifically, we 
double the renewable potential at the 5 sites in California to avoid situations in which California 
could potentially deplete its renewable energy potential. All assumed capital costs of generation 
expansion are based on WECC and Energy and Environmental Economics (2017) and are 




Transmission line candidates are categorized into two types: backbone reinforcements and 
renewable connections. There are 54 reinforcement candidates for additions to the backbone 
network in Fig. 4, most of which are additions in transfer capability for existing corridors. In 
addition, there are 104 renewable connection candidates that can be developed to connect the 53 
candidate sites. Transmission expansion candidate costs are calculated on the basis of the length 
of the transmission line, width, type of land-use, and voltage level, by using the base cost of the 
conductors and substations, as found in WECC (2014). Four days (96 hours) are simulated to 
represent the year 2034. 
RPS data for the year 2034 are from DSIRE (DSIRE, 2018), and demand data are from 
WECC-LTPT (WECC, 2016). Because state-level RPS policies do not include every type of utility 
in the state, we adjust the requirement according to the share of the total electricity sales covered 
by RPS. In cases in which the RPS data for 2034 are unavailable, we assume that the RPS will 
remain at the latest specified number. The alternative compliance penalty is $100/MWh for all 
states with RPS; i.e., if there is a renewable energy capacity shortage, the LSE must pay such a 
penalty (or buy renewable credits from the state government) to fulfill the RPS requirement. The 
RPS requirements used in this work are shown in Table 3. For British Columbia, there is a $40/ton 
carbon tax, but no BCA is implemented. 
Table 3. Assumed RPS Requirements in 2034 
State or Province  RPS  State  RPS 
Alberta  30.0%  Mexico  0.0% 
Arizona  14.6%  New Mexico  16.1% 
British Columbia**  93.0%  Nevada  22.8% 
California*  59.3%  Oregon  35.2% 
Colorado  21.0%  Utah  0.0% 
Idaho  0.0%  Washington  13.1% 
Montana  13.4%  Wyoming  0.0% 
* CA also requires 75% of the RPS requirement to be met by in-state renewable generation 
** All WECC regions except British Columbia are assumed to consider generation from large (>20 MW) hydroelectric facilities 
as non-renewable  
 
We place some restrictions on interstate energy credit trading. First, in the case of existing 
generation capacity, only those nodes with an aggregate capacity >200 MW can sell energy credits 
out of state, under the assumption that exporting power to California is difficult for small 
generators. However, most of the capacity in the rest of WECC (ROW), including wind and solar, 




only the home state, the neighboring state, or the state adjacent to a neighboring state. We also 
introduce several simplifications of the model setup to accelerate the solution process. For example, 
power flow is modeled with a transshipment power flow model rather than as a DC load flow, 
transmission and generation capacity can be expanded in continuous amounts rather than fixed 
increments, and unit commitment and storage expansion are not included. At the expense of larger 
models and slower computation times, these complications could be included. 
5 Results 
This section summarizes the comparative statics of the alternative BCA schemes based on 
alternative deemed rates (Table 2).  First, we first examine the dynamic properties of 
marginal/average emission rates resulting from calculation of the dynamic DRs. We then examine 
the impacts of adopting different BCA DR schemes. The impact metrics include overall regional 
(WECC) carbon emissions, indicators of emission leakage based on the distributions of carbon 
emissions between California and the Rest of WECC (ROW), distribution of electricity production 
among states and generation types, total market costs, and California consumer payments. 
Although our emphasis is on overall efficiency (the minimum market cost of achieving alternative 
targets for emissions reduction), the other metrics shed light on trade-offs between the local and 
regional objectives, and can help California policymakers understand the impacts of the policy on 
their consumers and voters. 
5.1 Dynamic Marginal and Average Emission Rates 
In determining DRs, it is important to understand how marginal/average emissions rates 
vary over time. Fig. 5 shows California’s marginal emission rates of internal and external 
generators at different hours on one of the four days as an example (Sept 30th, 2034). Several 
observations can be made. First, short-run marginal emission rates indeed vary at different hours, 
i.e., the rates are dynamic, ranging from 0 to approximately 0.7 tons/MWh. Second, the internal 





Fig. 5. Marginal emission rates (internal (up) and external (bottom) to California) for the last 
ten (10) iterations (dotted lines) and their average (red line with cross marks) (carbon price = 
$40/ton, September 30th, 2034). 
The average emission rates for one day are shown in Fig. 6.  Similar results are observed 
for the other three days simulated in 2034. Overall, the average emission rates show more stability 
over the hours than the marginal emission rates. The average emission rates of external generators 
are universally higher than their internal counterparts and are less variable because California is a 
relatively clean state with almost no coal capacity (except in the must-run combined heat and 





Fig. 6. Average emission rate (internal and external to California, carbon price = $40/ton, 
September 30th, 2034). 
 
5.2 Emission and Generation Distributions from Alternative DR Schemes 
As illustrated in the simple case in Section 2, BCA with facility-based DR can be 
ineffective to mitigate the leakage caused by unilateral carbon pricing, but a DR scheme that is 
indifferent to import sources can mitigate leakage by eliminating incentives to shuffle contracts. 
Fig. 7 shows a similar story in the complex system by the results of emission distributions for all 
investigated DR schemes (Cases 1-4). As a reference, without California's carbon price, our model 
shows that in 2034, WECC emits 281.27 Mtons/year in total, of which California accounts for 
30.09 Mtons/year and the ROW 251.18 Mtons/year (shown as the horizontal lines in Fig. 7). As a 
comparison, in 2017, California reported a carbon emission of 38.58 Mtons from in-state 





Fig. 7. Carbon emissions of California (a), the rest of the WECC (b), and WECC total (c), with 
different DR schemes and carbon prices, in the year 2034.  Horizontal red line represents the 
emission level without the California carbon price. 
 
Our first observation is that carbon pricing within California can increase WECC-wide 
emissions, resulting from the possibility that physical carbon leakage can exceed 100%, similar to 
the simple case in Section 2. This happens because the increased electricity production from ROW 
is supported by gas-fired power plants that are less efficient (i.e., have higher heat rates) than the 
California ones that are shut down because of the carbon pricing. Essentially, there are two possible 




becomes more expensive, and it is more economical to switch either to local renewable generators 
or to import more.  Given that the aggressive RPS already supports local renewable generators, 
the economical option is more imports.  The system chooses not to build and dispatch more 
emitting-free renewable generation for incremental imports because of two reasons: (a) the units 
already exists and have been fully dispatched without California carbon pricing, or (b) building 
new ones is more expensive than shuffling contracts.  
The increase of WECC-wide emissions occurs when any of the following schemes are 
implemented: (i) a facility-based DR scheme; (ii) a constant, facility-neutral, but low DR, or (iii) 
a dynamic DR is chosen based on the internal average emission rate. For the latter case, the large 
amount of leakage is because the DRs, though dynamic, are frequently low. Furthermore, as might 
be expected, carbon leakage worsens when carbon prices are higher. For instance, among all 
investigated DR schemes, the highest WECC-wide emission increase results from the no BCA 
case (DR = 0 tons/MWh) while the carbon price is $80/ton; in that case, California’s emissions 
decrease by 20.13 Mtons/year relative to no carbon policy, but the ROW emissions increase by 
21.82 Mtons/year, thus increasing system-wide emissions of 1.69 Mtons/year.  We are not saying 
that this is the present effect (or lack thereof) of AB32, but are pointing out that this is a risk under 
some possible future conditions under this particular BCA policy.  
The impacts of various DR schemes on emission share one commonality: all show a major 
shift in emissions between California and the ROW. Although the volume of this emission shift is 
large (e.g., parts (a) and (b) of Fig. 7 show emissions of different schemes differing by as much as 
30 Mtons/year, which is the same order of magnitude as all of California’s emissions), the system-
wide emission reductions are much more limited (Fig. 7(c) has a range of 6 Mtons/year).  
Finally, in each carbon price case, the largest reduction in system-wide emissions is 
achieved by setting a dynamic DR according to the external marginal emission rate. For instance, 
when the carbon price is $80/ton, Fig. 7 (c) shows that DRs set by an external marginal emission 
rate cut the WECC-wide emissions by 4.33 Mtons/years, and the second-largest emission 
reduction is 1.87 Mtons/year when DR is a constant 0.5 tons/MWh. This dynamic DR achieves 
the most emission reduction by setting a "high" emission rate at the "right" time, i.e., when coal-
fired power is the marginal source of power in the ROW and thus the major cause of leakage when 




DR schemes change the locations of emissions by shifting gas power generation between 
California and ROW. Table 4 shows the generation mixes of California, the ROW, and WECC 
total if California were to adopt no carbon prices. In contrast, Fig. 8 shows the change in the 
generation mixes when the carbon price is $80/ton under different DR schemes. The patterns of 
impacts of other carbon prices are similar (not shown). For instance, in cases in which constant 
and facility-neutral DR is implemented, the higher DR makes imports more expensive. 
Consequently, California will choose to rely on more internal gas power from inside, and 
California’s emissions will grow substantially. However, because California has implemented an 
aggressive (60%) RPS rule, we observe no significant impact of California carbon pricing on 
renewables. 
Furthermore, only the dynamic DR set by an external marginal emission rate can make a 
significant dent in coal-fired production in ROW (e.g., 5.74 TWh/year when the carbon price is 
$80/ton in Fig. 8(b), from 174.10 TWh/year (Table 4) under no regulation to 168.36 TWh under 
the policy). Again, this outcome is because a high DR is set when the marginal units supporting 
California’s load are largely coal power plants. This impact strongly depends on the carbon price 
that the coal production reduction is lower with lower carbon price (2.86 TWh/year cut when 
California carbon price = $40/ton). 
Table 4. Generation Mixes of California, the Rest of the WECC, and WECC total, when the 
California Carbon Price is $0/ton, in the Year 2034 






Bio  11.61  13.17  24.78 
Geo  23.58  13.07  36.65 
Hydro  25.84  205.82  231.66 
Nuclear  0  44.75  44.75 
Solar  13.65  9.07  22.72 
Wind  23.69  52.96  76.65 
Subtotal  98.37  338.84  437.21 
New 
Renewable 
Bio  1.76  0  1.76 
Geo  23.81  21.12  44.93 
Solar  41.13  10.70  51.83 
Wind  11.13  62.42  73.55 
Subtotal  77.83  94.24  172.07 
Existing Coal  1.17  174.10  175.27 
Existing Natural Gas  75.48  174.90  250.38 
New Natural Gas  3.86  53.19  57.05 






Fig. 8. Change in Generation mixes of (a) California, the (b) Rest of the WECC, and (c) WECC 
total, when the carbon price is $80/ton, in the year 2034, compared with the case without a 
carbon price. 
5.3 Accounting Carbon Leakage 
The tonnage of carbon leakage has been explored in the previous section, in which the 
results of Fig. 7(a) and (b) show, for example, large decreases in California emissions are generally 
accompanied by compensating increases in ROW emissions.  Policies that prevent leakage, such 




the leakage. Those policies for which Fig. 7(c) shows increases in total emissions imply that 
leakage exceeds the internal California emissions reductions in those cases; therefore, a physical 
leakage rate higher than 100%. As a reminder, the physical leakage rate is calculated as 100%× 
(ROW emission increases)/(California emission reductions). The result of a physical leakage 
exceeding 100% has been reported by Babiker (2005) at 130% using computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models for homogenous products between OECD countries and the rest of the 
globe. Furthermore, for the California carbon pricing system, the highest estimated leakage (100%) 
is by Bushnell et al. (2014) in an engineering-economic simulation with 2007 data. Lower physical 
leakage rates for the California system have also been reported: using a CGE model, Caron et al. 
(2015) calculate a physical leakage rate at 45% without BCA and 9% if BCA is implemented and 
reshuffling is banned. However, we should recognize that the tracking and banning of reshuffling 
are nearly impossible, and our market models do not restrict reshuffling, consistent with California 
law. These assumptions contribute to the high physical leakage rate that we estimate. 
The relative (percentage) accounting leakage metrics tell a slightly different story (Fig. 9). 
In calculating leakage amounts, it is necessary to have a baseline imputation of carbon dioxide 
associated with imports when there is no carbon policy.  However, this is ambiguous because there 
are multiple alternative optima involving different contracted flows.  To avoid artifactual 
exaggeration of leakage, the base amount of imputed carbon dioxide in imports is taken from a 





Fig. 9. Relative leakage (100% - system-wide emission reduction/regulated emission reduction) 
from cases with different DR schemes with different carbon prices, in the year 2034. 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from Fig. 9’s summary of percentage accounting leakage 
values under different policies. First, facility-based DR, the current practice in California’s 
implementation of carbon pricing, leads to a leakage >100% because of the increase in the WECC 
total emissions. As described before, the relative leakage is calculated as the relative difference 
between system-wide emission reduction and the reduction in regulated emissions (internal plus 
deemed carbon in imports), and a non-zero leakage indicates a mismatch between total WECC 
emissions and California emissions, which is equivalent to a divergence of the imputed imported 
emission reduction and actual ROW emission reduction.     
Second, the minimum leakage (which is actually negative on occasion) always occurs when 
the DR is set to a constant 0.38 tons/MWh. Because the minimum occurs at this value, we conclude 
that these DRs estimate the ROW emission reduction most accurately on an annual average basis.  
Finally, a close-to-zero relative leakage intriguingly does not necessarily lead to the 
maximum system-wide emission reduction, which instead occurs when the external marginal 
emission rate sets the dynamic DR. The leakage when system-wide emission reduction is 
maximized is approximately 36% to 51%, depending on the carbon price.  This indicates that the 




5.4 Transmission Expansion 
As shown in the simple model of Section 2, unilateral carbon prices and different choices 
of BCA affect the economic value of transmission and thus differ in the incentives they provide 
for grid reinforcements. Before summarizing the quantitative results, we reiterate that, as described 
in Section 4, two different sets of transmission expansion candidates are available in JHSMINE: 
(i) renewable interconnectors that deliver renewable generation to the grid and (ii) reinforcements 
of the grid’s backbone of transmission lines. Because all renewable generation investments require 
connections to the grid to deliver their output, the impact of alternative DR schemes on renewable 
interconnectors is implicit in the results of Section 6.2: under our case study assumptions, DR 
schemes that penalize only imports with different DRs have a negligible influence on the 
expansion of renewable interconnectors, because there is little or even negative impact on the 
renewable capacity itself (Fig. 8(a).)  
Consequently, in this section, we focus on backbone transmission investment impacts here, 
particularly interstate transmission expansion. Fig. 10 shows two examples of effects on interstate 
transmission corridors when the California emission regulator implements various DR schemes 
under a range of carbon price scenarios. First, implementing carbon pricing generally encourages 
more interstate transmission, and this effect is higher at greater carbon prices (compare the red 
lines and other solutions in Fig. 10). Because the economic value of transmission between 
California and the ROW is largely derived from delivering power into California, less California 
local production for any reason incentivizes more transmission build-out between California and 
the ROW. But because the major effect of an effective BCA scheme is to return power generation 
back to California, such schemes lead to less transmission build-out between California and the 
ROW than ineffective schemes. For instance, when the carbon price is $20/ton and no BCA is 
implemented, the investment in transmission between California and Oregon is 775 MW; build-





Fig. 10. Transmission capacity expansion of the California-Oregon corridor (a) and British 
Columbia-Washington corridor (b) under alternative DR scheme/carbon price combinations, 
year 2034. 
Although only imports flowing into California are subject to BCA, the consequent 
discouragement of transmission expansion can also occur at non-California boundaries. For 
example, transmission expansion between British Columbia and Washington decreases from 
approximately 350 MW to 100 MW as BCA becomes more effective.  
5.5 Economic Efficiency 
In the illustrative results in Section 2, we show that an effective BCA can be designed to 
simultaneously lower the resource cost and the emissions compared to the no BCA case. Here in 
this section, we show the comprehensive results in the complex system and confirm our 
observations.  We show the economic efficiency of different carbon pricing and BCA schemes by 
plotting trade-offs between cost (either WECC-wide resource cost or cost to California consumers) 
against WECC-wide total emissions (Fig. 11). First, we compare alternative BCA policies, 
identifying some that are Pareto efficient relative to others that are instead worse in both cost and 




inferior from a WECC-wide cost and emissions perspective, but is efficient considering only 
payments by California consumers.   Second, we compare California-only carbon pricing with 
WECC-wide carbon pricing, and confirm that unilateral action by one jurisdiction within a larger 
regional power market results in cost-ineffective emissions reductions compared to a region-wide 
policy. 
The WECC-wide resource cost is the sum of generation, transmission expansion, and 
operation costs, deducting RPS penalties as well as carbon payments, which are transfer payments 
from generators or LSEs to governments and, ultimately, taxpayers.  Cost to California consumers 
is quantified by dividing the total annual California LSE payment (in $) by the total energy load 
(in MWh), with the LSE payment adjusted by reimbursements of the payment received by the 
California government or California ISO on behalf of consumers.  These reimbursed payments 
include economic rents due to carbon payments (to the California Air Resources Board) and 
congestion rents on the California grid (defined as the within-California transmission congestion 







Fig. 11. Trade-offs between WECC resource costs (a) and the cost to California consumers (b), 
against the WECC-wide emissions, comparing alternative DR scheme/California carbon price 
policy combinations. For some example DR schemes, with different carbon prices are connected 








Comparison of BCA Policies under California Carbon Pricing.  Fig. 11(a) shows trade-
offs between WECC-wide resource costs and emissions. Among all DR settings/California carbon 
price policies, the dominant (Pareto optimal) policies are located between points A and B.  These 
include dynamic DR schemes based on external marginal emission rates (Case 4.b), along with 
some solutions with high constant DR (Case 3). The Pareto dominant alternatives show that by 
adopting a BCA with DRs based on Case 4.b, by increasing the CO2e price in California from 
$0/ton to $80/ton, approximately 4.3 MT/yr of emissions can be avoided at a WECC-wide 
incremental cost of 140 $M/yr (Fig. 11(a)), or just over $30/ton. The cost to California ratepayers 
of that emission decrease is $4.0/MWh (Fig. 11(b)), or $1370 M/yr (based on California’s annual 
power consumption of 343.7 TWh in the year 2034).  Thus, other market participants (generators 
and ROW consumers) are made better off by 1370-140 = 1230 $M/yr by such a policy change, 
mainly because of power rate hikes induced by the increase in the marginal cost of supply to 
California.  (Note that some of that 1230 $/M/yr is earned by regulated California utility generation, 
which would then ultimately be returned to consumers in the form of lower regulated rates, which 
is not considered here.) 
Meanwhile, Fig. 11(a) show that other DR solutions are dominated by the dynamic DR 
(Case 4.b external marginal) and some of the high constant DR solutions, as they lie to the 
northeast of the dominant points. For instance, Point F (Case 1, no DR, $80/ton carbon price in 
California) costs $340M more in WECC-wide costs while increasing emissions by 1.69 MT/yr. 
Facility-based DR and internal marginal emissions-based DR perform nearly as badly under that 
high carbon price.     
By selecting a Pareto efficient DR scheme, the model indicates that WECC system 
generation and transmission investments and operations would be cleaner and less costly. However, 
a caveat should be noted: a Pareto improvement is not ensured just by changing the DR policy; 
both DR and carbon prices need to be adjusted, in general. For example, if the carbon price is 
$20/ton (circles in Fig. 11), moving the solution from a constant DR of 0.38 tons/MWh (Point C, 
Emissions = 280.84 MT/yr, Resource cost = 32.94 $B/yr, Fig. 11 (a)) to a dynamic DR based on 
the external marginal emission rate (Point D, Emissions = 280.18 MT/yr, Resource cost = $32.96 
$B/yr) indeed cuts system-wide emission (by 0.66 Mtons/year), but the WECC resource cost is 




and low fixed DR values not only make the system emit more but also increase costs. Their 
efficiency worsens when the carbon price becomes higher.  
As mentioned in Section 1, another design feature of BCA schemes is whether power 
exports from a regulated jurisdiction will have their emission payments rebated. Although not 
discussed here, our previous analysis (Xu, 2020) shows that rebating that cost to exports of power 
from California can also provide efficiency gains compared to the one-way (imports only) BCA 
based on facility-based DR. However, the solutions are still inferior in terms of cost and 
emissionsto the Pareto frontier solutions identified in Fig. 11(a). For example, when carbon price 
= $40/ton, a BCA scheme that rebates exports as well as charges imports with the facility-based 
DR results in a WECC resource cost at 33.01 $B/yr and total emissions at 280.93 MT/yr, using the 
same database in this paper. Compared to Point F in Fig. 11(a) (facility-based BCA, imports only),  
the emissions are lower by 1.73 MT/yr, and the WECC-wide cost is 150 $M/yr less, which is an 
efficiency gain of rebating allowances. However, at the same cost at 33.01 $B/yr, one-way BCA 
with dynamic DR based on external marginal emission rate (Case 4.b) results in even lower 
emissions (278.64 MT/yr, Point E in Fig. 11(a)). 
 Fig. 11(b) shows the trade-off between costs to California consumers and WECC-wide 
emissions. In general, California consumers would pay more with a higher carbon price. For 
example, without a carbon price, the model simulation shows that California consumers would 
buy electricity at $74.00/MWh in 2034; when the carbon price is $20/ton, the cost would increase 
to $74.75/MWh to $75.11/MWh, depending on the DR. However, the trade-offs also show that 
the curve formed by a dynamic DR (DR scheme Case 4.b based external marginal emission rate) 
in combination with different carbon prices still dominates other solutions, just as they do for 
WECC-wide cost.  This again indicates a promising efficiency gain relative to current policy (DR 
scheme Case 2, facility-based DR). Furthermore, within each price range, the cost of this dynamic 
DR to California consumers can sometimes be lower than the no BCA case. That is, given a carbon 
price, switching from no BCA (Case 1, as well as from Case 2, facility-based DR) can reduce the 
system-wide emissions, while also saving money for California consumers.  
Finally, constant DR schemes that minimize the relative leakage (i.e., fixed DR of 0.38 
tons/MWh, which Section 5.3 identifies as having the lowest leakage rate) lie on the Pareto frontier 
when considering WECC-cost vs. WECC emission trade-offs, but are clearly dominated by other 




solutions that are best at avoiding leakage systematically shift costs to California consumers from 
other market participants. 
Efficiency of California versus WECC-Wide Carbon Pricing. Although the dynamic 
DR based on the external marginal rate provides an economic efficiency gain for unilateral carbon 
pricing relative to other DR policies, this BCA-augmented unilateral carbon price in California 
clearly remains far less efficient than the WECC-wide carbon pricing. For perspective, Fig. 11 
shows four additional points (connected by a green dashed line) that represent efficient benchmark 
policies for the entire WECC region: a WECC-wide carbon price/tax applied at $0/ton (for British 
Columbia, this WECC-wide carbon price is on top of its existing carbon tax), $5/ton, $10/ton, and 
$15/ton. The results indicate that California can unilaterally motivate some changes in west-wide 
emissions, as the red frontier shows—but the cost of doing so per ton of emissions reduction is 
much greater than the cost of an efficient west-wide policy. For instance in Fig. 11(a), the slopes 
from the no carbon price case (B) to points along the red frontier (California carbon pricing only 
with external marginal emissions-based DR, with carbon prices of $20/ton to $80/ton) are $20/ton, 
$27.7/ton, $30.1/ton, and $32/ton of reduction, respectively. These costs are approximately three 
to five times as high as the incremental costs of $3.20/ton, $5.44/ton, and $9.44/ton for the cases 
of WECC-wide carbon prices of $5/ton, $10/ton, and $15/ton.  Using a WECC-wide efficient 
policy to achieve the same reductions as the most efficient California-only policy would cost only 
about one-quarter as much.  California ratepayers would also pay much less (Fig. 11(b)). 
6 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Carbon pricing is widely regarded as the most cost-efficient and theoretically attractive 
approach to cut carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector. However, carbon leakage, owing 
to the homogeneity of electricity and the limited geographical coverage of carbon pricing when 
implemented by a local jurisdiction, can substantially weaken the effectiveness of local carbon 
pricing when the jurisdiction is embedded in a larger regional power market. If implemented 
carefully with effective policies to assign emissions to imports, border carbon adjustments can be 
a remedy that mitigates carbon leakage and improves the economic efficiency of local carbon 
pricing. BCA policies based on ineffective deemed emission rates for imports, however, can 
provide little incentive to reduce emissions outside the regulated jurisdiction, and can even worsen 




of the source of the import contract, contract shuffling among the rest of the region’s power plants 
can easily reduce the deemed imported emissions without substantially changing the dispatch and 
thus emissions of those plants. Thus, the performance of BCA in power systems is greatly 
undermined, and new ways to set the DR for electricity imports are warranted. 
This paper explores the potential cost and emission impacts of different BCA schemes that 
could possibly be implemented in the California carbon pricing system, a local carbon pricing 
system in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council of North America. Our simulation shows 
that the impacts of California carbon pricing and potential BCAs on the WECC have multiple 
aspects.  Based on estimates from a WECC-wide generation and transmission investment and 
operations model for the year 2034, we find that if there is a California carbon price but no BCA, 
then California emissions decrease.  However, WECC-wide emissions increase in compensation, 
perhaps by even more than the California reduction. The emission leakage is largely due to a shift 
from gas-fired power from existing gas power plants of California to those in the rest of the WECC. 
More incentives for interstate transmission development will result because of the California 
carbon price, and this effect is not limited to the California boundary. Under the assumptions of 
our case study, local carbon pricing would raise both the cost to California consumers and the cost 
to the WECC in total without lowering emissions, and, consequently, California carbon pricing 
without BCA is ineffective and costly. 
Meanwhile, implementing BCA with a facility-based DR scheme that is the basis of the 
actual California BCA system is only marginally better, as indicated both by our schematic model 
in Section 2 and the detailed transmission-generation expansion model in Sections 3-5. The  
efficiency improvement is negligible because of contract shuffling, similar to other findings in the 
literature (Bushnell et al., 2014). We emphasize that our conclusions concerning the low 
effectiveness of facility-based DR schemes are limited to the electricity sector, and depend on 
specific assumptions that are plausible in the electricity sector but not in others, e.g., inelastic 
demand and a subnational market. Consequently, our conclusions may be more or less applicable 
to other sectors, e.g., the steel sector (Mehling and Ritz, 2020), depending on the ease of shuffling. 
However, a constant and facility-neutral DR can bring gas power back to California and decrease 
the tonnage of emissions leakage. A high facility-neutral DR also provides some efficiency gains 
by simultaneously lowering the WECC-wide cost and emissions without making California 




transmission lines. In reality, source specification of the imports to California will not always be 
possible, and a high DR of 0.428 tons/MWh will be applied to the imports. For example, in 2017, 
among all imported electricity (around 94 TWh), 20% of imports are unspecified (CARB, 2019a). 
Thus, we conclude that the real performance of the present California BCA should be intermediate 
between our solutions of constant DR = 0.44 tons/MWh (which is relatively efficient) and facility-
based DR (which we project increases costs and emissions). 
The most notable policy conclusion is that, among all investigated DRs, the dynamic DR 
set by external marginal emission rates provides the greatest efficiency gain, and its solutions are 
Pareto efficient relative to other DR policies. It is also the only BCA scheme that decreases coal 
power production in the rest of the WECC, because it sets a high DR at the same times that non-
California marginal units are coal powered.  However, other solutions (not shown) indicate that 
these changes in generation mix are very modest relative, for instance, what would result from a 
carbon price applied to the entire WECC. 
As the results suggest, switching from the current facility-based BCA to dynamically 
setting a facility-neutral DR based on marginal units outside of California appears to be a 
reasonable and beneficial move for California. However, estimating marginal emissions requires 
some effort and is error-prone, especially because the information on the marginal unit is usually 
ex post, i.e., which unit is marginal is known only after the system dispatch. If the DR is updated 
with the marginal information and market participants are given another chance to bid and re-
dispatch, the marginal units may well change. We have observed this phenomenon in our results. 
We also acknowledge that actually determining marginal emissions rates (or similarly, marginal 
emission displacement rate of renewable energy) is difficult, especially where unit commitment 
and ramp-limitations have a significant impact on operations (Chen et al., 2008; Chyong et al., 
2019; Thomson et al., 2017). Nevertheless, our findings still suggest that the estimation of the 
marginal emission rate does not need to be exact to provide economic efficiency gain. We also 
suggest that consideration be given to rebating emissions allowances to exports of power from 
California, which may under some conditions lower costs and regional emissions both, compared 
to facility-based BCA that only charges imports.  However, elsewhere we have found that the 
efficiency gains from doing so are smaller than the gains obtained by implementing a BCA policy 




Finally, and notably, even if augmented by the most efficient DR scheme, the unilateral 
carbon price of California remains far less efficient than a hypothetical WECC-wide carbon pricing 
policy. Thus, together with enhancing California’s current BCA scheme, we also suggest 
expanding California’s carbon pricing regimes through collaboration with other states, such as 
Oregon and Washington, as a better approach.   
Acknowledgements 
This article was developed under Assistance Agreement No. RD835871 awarded by the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to Yale University. It has not been formally reviewed by 
EPA. The views expressed in this document are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Agency. EPA does not endorse any products or commercial services mentioned 
in this publication.  Partial assistance was also provided by NSF under Grant 1711188. 
References 
Babiker, M.H., 2005. Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon Leakage. 
Journal of International Economics 65, 421-445. 
Böhringer, C., Balistreri, E.J., Rutherford, T.F., 2012. The Role of Border Carbon 
Adjustment in Unilateral Climate Policy: Overview of an Energy Modeling Forum Study (EMF 
29). Energy Economics 34, S97-S110. 
Bushnell, J., Chen, Y., Zaragoza-Watkins, M., 2014. Downstream Regulation of CO2 
Emissions in California's Electricity Sector. Energy Policy 64, 313-323. 
CAISO, 2017. EIM Greenhouse Gas Enhancement Revised Draft Final Proposal. 
California Independent System Operator, Folsom, CA. [Available]: 
www.caiso.com/Documents/RevisedDraftFinalProposal-
EnergyImbalanceMarketGreenhouseGasEnhancements.pdf 









CARB, 2019a. GHG Current California Emission Inventory Data. California Air 
Resources Board, Sacramento, CA. [Available]: ww2.arb.ca.gov/ghg-inventory-data 
CARB, 2019b. Summary of California-Quebec Joint Auction Settlement Prices and 
Results. California Air Resources Board, Sacramento, CA. [Available]: 
ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/results_summary.pdf 
Caron, J., Rausch, S., Winchester, N., 2015. Leakage from Sub-National Climate Policy: 
The Case of California's Cap-and-Trade Program. The Energy Journal 36, 167-190. 
Chen, Y., Liu, A.L., Hobbs, B.F., 2011. Economic and Emissions Implications of Load-
Based, Source-Based, and First-Seller Emissions Trading Programs under California AB32. 
Operations Research 59, 696-712. 
Chen, Y., Sijm, J., Hobbs, B.F., Lise, W., 2008. Implications of CO2 Emissions Trading 
for Short-Run Electricity Market Outcomes in Northwest Europe. Journal of Regulatory 
Economics 34, 251-281. 
Chyong, C.K., Guo, B., Newbery, D., 2019. The Impact of a Carbon Tax on the CO2 
Emissions Reduction of Wind. The Energy Journal 41, 1. 
DSIRE, 2018. Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency. N.C. Clean 
Energy Technology Center. [Available]: www.dsireusa.org/ 
Fischer, C., Fox, A.K., 2012. Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage: Border 
Carbon Adjustments Versus Rebates. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64, 
199-216. 
Gabriel, S.A., Conejo, A.J., Fuller, J.D., Hobbs, B.F., Ruiz, C., 2013. Complementarity 
Modeling in Energy Markets. Springer, New York, NY, New York. 
Greenberg, H.J., Murphy, F.H., 1985. Computing Market Equilibria with Price Regulations 
Using Mathematical Programming. Operations Research 33, 935-954. 
Hawkes, A.D., 2010. Estimating Marginal CO2 Emissions Rates for National Electricity 
Systems. Energy Policy 38, 5977-5987. 
Hobbs, B.F., Metzler, C.B., Pang, J.S., 2000. Strategic Gaming Analysis for Electric Power 
Systems: An MPEC Approach. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 15, 638-645. 
Hytowitz, R.S.B., 2018. Optimization Modeling to Address the Impacts of Electric Power 




the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD. [Available]: 
jhir.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/61044 
IPCC, 2014. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, 
II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC, 
Geneva, Switzerland,. [Available]: www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/ 
Ismer, R., Neuhoff, K., 2007. Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible Way to Support 
Stringent Emission Trading. European Journal of Law and Economics 24, 137-164. 
Kim, W., Chattopadhyay, D., Park, J.-b., 2010. Impact of Carbon Cost on Wholesale 
Electricity Price: A Note on Price Pass-through Issues. Energy 35, 3441-3448. 
Lanz, B., Rausch, S., 2011. General Equilibrium, Electricity Generation Technologies and 
the Cost of Carbon Abatement: A Structural Sensitivity Analysis. Energy Economics 33, 1035-
1047. 
Levin, T., Kwon, J., Botterud, A., 2019. The Long-Term Impacts of Carbon and Variable 
Renewable Energy Policies on Electricity Markets. Energy Policy 131, 53-71. 
Mehling, M.A., Ritz, R.A., 2020. Going Beyond Default Intensities in an EU Carbon 
Border Adjustment Mechanism, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2087. Faculty of 
Economics, University of Cambridge. [Available]: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-
files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe2087.pdf 
Morneau, B., 2018. Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act. Justice Laws Websiste. 
[Available]: laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/G-11.55/ 
NYISO, 2018. IPPTF Carbon Pricing Proposal, Rensselaer, NY. [Available]: 
www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/3911819/Carbon-Pricing-
Proposal%20December%202018.pdf/72fe5180-ef24-f700-87e5-fb6f300fb82c 
Özdemir, Ö., Hobbs, B.F., van Hout, M., Koutstaal, P.R., 2020. Capacity Vs Energy 
Subsidies for Promoting Renewable Investment: Benefits and Costs for the EU Power Market. 
Energy Policy 137, 1-14. 
Palmer, K., Burtraw, D., Paul, A., Yin, H., 2017. Using Production Incentives to Avoid 
Emissions Leakage. Energy Economics 68, 45-56. 
Pavley, F., 2016. Senate Bill No. 32: California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006: 





PJM, 2019. 2014-2018 CO2, SO2 and NOx Emission Rates. PJM Interconnection, Valley 
Forge, PA. [Available]: www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/2018/2018-
emissions-report.ashx?la=en 
PJM, 2020. Expanded Results of Pjm Study of Carbon Pricing & Potential Leakage 
Mitigation Mechanisms. PJM. [Available]: https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-
groups/task-forces/cpstf/2020/20200821/20200821-item-03-pjm-study-results-de-md-nj-pa-va-il-
scenario.ashx 
RGGI, 2018. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. 
Ruth, M., Gabriel, S.A., Palmer, K.L., Burtraw, D., Paul, A., Chen, Y., Hobbs, B.F., Irani, 
D., Michael, J., Ross, K.M., Conklin, R., Miller, J., 2008. Economic and Energy Impacts from 
Participation in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: A Case Study of the State of Maryland. 
Energy Policy 36, 2279-2289. 
Samuelson, P.A., 1952. Spatial Price Equilibrium and Linear Programming. American 
Economic Review 42, 283-303. 
Sijm, J., Chen, Y., Hobbs, B.F., 2012. The Impact of Power Market Structure on CO2 Cost 
Pass-through to Electricity Prices under Quantity Competition – a Theoretical Approach. Energy 
Economics 34, 1143-1152. 
Siler-Evans, K., Azevedo, I.L., Morgan, M.G., 2012. Marginal Emissions Factors for the 
U.S. Electricity System. Environmental Science & Technology 46, 4742-4748. 
Thomson, R.C., Harrison, G.P., Chick, J.P., 2017. Marginal Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Displacement of Wind Power in Great Britain. Energy Policy 101, 201-210. 
WECC, 2014. TEPPC Transmission Capital Cost Report, Salt Lake City, UT. [Available]: 
www.wecc.org/Reliability/2014_TEPPC_Transmission_CapCost_Report_B+V.pdf 
WECC, 2016. Long-Term Planning Tool, Salt Lake City, UT. [Available]: 
www.wecc.org/Reliability/WECC%20Draft%20RC%202034%20v1.0%2020160916.zip 
WECC, 2017. 2026 Common Case Version 2.0. Western Electricity Coordinating Council, 






WECC, Energy and Environmental Economics, 2017. Review of Capital Costs for 
Generation Technologies. Western Electricity Coordinating Council, Salt Lake City, UT. 
[Available]: www.wecc.biz/Reliability/E3_WECC_CapitalCosts_FINAL.pdf 
Western Governors' Association, USDOE, 2009. Western Renewable Energy Zones - 
Phase 1 Report. Western Governors' Association and U.S. Dept. of Energy,. [Available]: 
www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/WREZ_Report.pdf 
World Bank, 2017. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2017. World Bank, Washington, 
DC. [Available]: openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28510 
Xu, Q., 2020. Essays on Regional Power System Investment: Value of Planning Model 
Enhancements, Transmission Generation Storage Co-Optimization, and Border Carbon 
Adjustment, Environmental Health and Engineering. Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, 
Maryland. [Available]: http://jhir.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/62461 
Xu, Q., Hobbs, B.F., 2019. Value of Model Enhancements: Quantifying the Benefit of 
Improved Transmission Planning Models. IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution 13, 2836 
- 2845. 
Zhao, J., Hobbs, B.F., Pang, J.-S., 2010. Long-Run Equilibrium Modeling of Emissions 
Allowance Allocation Systems in Electric Power Markets. Operations Research 58, 529-548. 
Zhu, Y., Tylavsky, D., 2018. An Optimization-Based DC-Network Reduction Method. 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 33, 2509-2517. 
 
